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Women have traditionally been underrepresented on boards of companies, but after
some social and legal pressure their presence has been increased during recent
years. This paper examines the relation of the presence of female directors both at
board meetings and at audit and remuneration committees, with CEO pay and the
shareholders’ consultative vote on managerial remuneration plans (“say on pay”). Using
a large sample of Spanish firms listed between 2011 and 2015, our study reveals that
firms with female representation on their remuneration committee, display lower levels of
CEO pay and CEO pay growth. We also obtain evidence that this effect is attributable
to the proprietary female directors. Additionally, from the “say on pay” perspective,
female membership of the remuneration committee is associated with a lower number of
votes in terms of director remuneration reports and related policies. Overall, our results
indicate that female directors on the remuneration committee contribute to a moderation
of executive remuneration growth and are consequently perceived by shareholders as
valuable resources in the design of executive remuneration plans. This confirms the
influence of the minority group, females, in the sustainable progress of these companies.
Our results support the presence of female directors not only as a social measure or
tokenism, but also as a contribution to good governance practice.
Keywords: remuneration, gender-discrimination, minority influence, board of directors, remuneration committee,
management, listed companies
INTRODUCTION
Cultural, gender and racial composition of boards of directors are counted amongst the most
relevant concerns for managers, shareholders, and directors of major corporations (Carter et al.,
2003). In the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016–2019, the European Commission
maintain their commitment to improve the gender balance in economic leadership positions, in
particular obtaining at least a 40% representation of the sex that is currently less represented within
the group of non-executive directors in listed companies (European Commission, 2016-2019). The
mandate of the European Commission urging EUmember States to increase the presence of female
directors has resulted in legislative reforms favoring their progressive incorporation to the boards
of listed companies. The incorporation of female directors to the firms’ boards is aimed at ensuring
equality in decision-making, but it could also be justified on the grounds of their specific ability to
improve company decision-making.
García-Izquierdo et al. Gender Diversity and Remuneration
The increase of female presence on corporate boards has been
promoted either by imposing legal quotas or by issuing softer
recommendations with respect to the codes of good governance.
Scandinavian countries have been pioneers in the use of a quota
system. In 2003 the Norwegian parliament passed a law requiring
40 per cent of corporate directors in listed companies to be
women (Rose, 2007). Other countries such as Belgium, France,
Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, and Spain use some forms
of quota system to improve female representation on the boards
of listed firms. Nonetheless, the quota system has been a matter
of discussion due to their convenience and acceptability when
dealing with meritocracy (e.g., Moscoso et al., 2012), as it could
be seen as a tokenism and/or as granting less value. However,
based on historical disadvantages and to offer an opportunity
to “rebalance” the society, the Spanish Organic Law 3/2007 on
effective equality between men and women has granted large
companies 8 years to include a minimum proportion of 40%
female directors on their boards. Nevertheless, this level of
presence on the part of female directors has not been achieved
so far.
In the case of Spain, the legal system of quotas co-exists
with the softer recommendations proposed by the code of good
governance which establishes that in 2020, female directors
should account for 30% of the board seats of listed companies.
The last report issued by the Spanish Association of Women
Entrepreneurs (Women CEO, 2017), reveals during the last year
an increase in the percentage of female directors at the IBEX 35
companies from 19.1 to 21.8% and that for the first time, all firms
in this index have female representation in their boards.
The under representation of female directors on the boards is
not only a Spanish issue, but is common tomost OECD countries,
also. Although there has been a steady increase in the number
of female directors over recent years, the OECD (2017) report
on the implementation of the OECD gender recommendations
shows that female directors constitute still a minoritarian group
in the boards of listed companies. In 2016 female directors
accounted for only 20% of the directorships in listed OECD
companies, and as few as 4.8% of chief executive officer (CEO)
positions were occupied by women. These figures were slightly
higher than the averages of 16.4 and 2.4% for female directors
and CEOs respectively in 2013.
Although female directors represent a minority within the
boards of listed companies in developed countries, the presence
of minorities in boards of directors can influence decision-
making. In this sense, even inmale dominated boards, appointing
female directors may improve the working environment of the
group (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997), and as a result, gender
diverse boards meet more frequently and suffer less from
absenteeism (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). There is a growing
body of studies that analyse the effect of gender diverse boards
on firms’ affairs. The results obtained are not conclusive so far.
There is some evidence suggesting that female directors improve
firms’ performance (Adams et al., 2011; Hutchinson et al., 2015;
Terjesen et al., 2016) and also that it has a negative impact on
the firm’s stock prices (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The effect of
female directors on firm’s risk is also unclear with some studies
suggesting a reduction of firms’ risk taking (Lenard et al., 2014;
Liu et al., 2014; Hutchinson et al., 2015) and others find no effect
at all (Sila et al., 2016). However, the identification of a clear
relationship between boards’ gender diversity and firms’ metrics
of risk might be impeded by the fact that risk measures such as
stock volatility or its systematic or idiosyncratic components are
subject to many external factors uncontrolled by the board.
Our study follows a more direct approach to analyse the
female’s influence on the boards’ functioning. Instead of focusing
our attention on metrics of firms’ risk, we analyse the association
between female directors and a board decision with a high impact
on firm risk taking: managerial pay. A question of special interest
in the company is the way in which the board of directors uses
compensation systems to align interests between shareholders
and managers. From this perspective, we study the role played
by female directors on managerial remuneration design as a
determinant of the company’s risk level.
The board of directors and its remuneration committee
are both responsible for hiring, firing, and designing the
compensation of top managers. Setting top managerial
remuneration is one of the most problematic decisions at
firm level, since top managers can exert a major influence on
the bodies responsible for this decision (i.e., the board and
its remuneration committee). Powerful managers can tilt the
balance in favor of their own interests when deciding managerial
pay levels and structure. Managerial power can often be behind
the growth in executive remuneration and is more often than
not unjustified by firm growth or profitability. In order to avoid
managerial risk aversion, the remuneration packages of top
managers have incorporated variable elements based on firms’
performance as well as equity and option based pay. The positive
relation between the value or stock options and the firms’ stock
volatility constitutes a source of risk-taking incentives for top
managers. An inadequate pay mix can greatly alter managerial
attitudes toward risk taking, resulting in an incentive for
misalignment. An excessive use of options-based compensation
has been attributed as being one of the main causes of the global
financial crisis in 2007 (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Chesney
et al., 2012; Gregg et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2015). Similarly,
there is evidence of a positive association between the use of
options-based CEO remuneration and socially irresponsible
activities (McGuire et al., 2003; Bouslah et al., 2018).
Our contribution to the literature on board diversity is
twofold. First, by focusing on the analysis of female directors
and how the latter can influence the direct outcome of boards’
decisions (i.e., CEO pay). Rather than analyzing a firm level
outcome such as firm risk, we try to isolate our results from
the confounding effects of outside factors that may affect firms’
risk or performance. Second, we contribute to the scant group
of works analyzing the effect of board gender diversity on CEO
pay setting. To our knowledge, the only evidence provided by
Adams and Ferreira (2009) uses a sample of large US firms. Our
analysis has been conducted for the Spanish market. Therefore,
the risk reducing influence of female directors observed in the
US market might differ in the case of Spain where the use of
option-based managerial compensation is much less common
than in the US context. Our results could be extrapolated to
other European countries with similar CEO pay structures. This
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is indeed a matter of interest given that Union member countries
are expected to implement UE directives seeking board gender
diversity.
The remainder sections of the paper are structured as follows.
In section Objective we do a review of previous literature. In the
next two sections we describe our data and empirical approach.
We follow by presenting and discussing our results in section
Results and finally in section Discussion we extract conclusions.
GENDER DIVERSITY, DISCRIMINATION,
AND MANAGEMENT
Female Under Representation at the Upper
Echelons
Women have traditionally been excluded from the active work
force and remain under-represented in managerial positions
(Tatli et al., 2013), experiencing the “glass ceiling” effect (Pichler
et al., 2008; Cech and Blair-Loy, 2010), and consequently remain
in an unfavorable situation. According to the 2010–2016 national
labor force survey conducted by the PewResearch Center, women
corporate power is limited although women represent 40% or
more of the work force in more than 80 countries globally.
Additionally, the total number of female directors and the rate
of increase in their numbers over time remain somewhat scarce.
Nevertheless, women have been gaining ground on corporate
boards in recent years. In 2015, women held 17.9% of the board
seats in Fortune 1,000 companies. The proportion of female
directors on the boards of large public firms listed in EU 28
countries has increased from 18.6% in 2014 to 23.3% in 2016.
Female board members in IBEX35 firms increased by 13.75% in
2016 and the total percentage of female directors in the IBEX-
35−19.83%—is slowly getting closer to the European average.
These meager figures of female representation show that there is
still a long way to achieving equal career opportunities for men
and women.
Legislation has encouraged diversity in management teams,
but both intentional and unintentional institutional barriers exist
in the workplace (Joshi et al., 2015). Even when they are in
high status occupations, women often face challenges at work,
including discrimination (Hahm et al., 2010). As a result, they
experience issues of visibility, that is, increased experiences of
heightened visibility and invisibility (Broadbridge and Simpson,
2011).
We can trace the roots of female discrimination at work
from two main but different perspectives: individual and
organizational. The organizational perspective would seem
to be more relevant in this case, with some approaches
dealing with similar problems, mainly gender stereotyping
of managerial positions (Schein, 2007), so we are going
to outline the organizational perspective. Stone-Romero and
Stone (2005) “presented an interesting model that analyses
discrimination” from the perspective of decision-makers. It
highlights discrimination as being the result of categorizing
individuals according to group membership in a way that
decision-making is influenced by stereotypes. In general, women
stereotypes are “viewed as less suitable for managerial jobs
when compared to the stereotypes of male, white, middle-aged
workers (Goldman et al., 2006),” who seem to represent hard or
technical competences (i.e., knowledge, abilities, self-confidence,
assertiveness, and dominance). The fact that these demands
are key to accessing high-status managerial and professional
jobs contributes to the problem; even more so, when women
are associated with female soft competences (i.e., teamworking,
communication, and emotional support). Therefore, criteria for
job access are presumably fostered and biased because of this kind
of stereotyping (Schein, 2007).
The social identity perspective (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), “is
mainly based on stating” that group members (ingroup) tend
to protect their self-esteem in order to achieve a positive and
particular social identity. This can result in discrimination, either
directly or indirectly, competing, separating or punishing the
outgroup by giving preferential treatment to the ingroup, and
ultimately, leading to the so-called ingroup bias phenomenon.
In this sense, the statistical discrimination model deals with the
stereotypical orientation of the employer on average data about
the possible performance of a particular group, and protecting
the ingroup as well. According to this theory, inequality may exist
and persist between demographic groups even when economic
agents are non-prejudiced. Following Rodgers (2009), this type of
discrimination can result in a self-reinforcing vicious circle over
time, as on exit, average individuals from the discriminated group
are discouraged from participating in the market or improving
their skills as their (average) return on investment is less than for
the non-discriminated group. But there are other approaches for
the explanation of gender discrimination.
The occupational segregation model refers to the case where
the representatives of different groups of workers have unequal
access to employment positions. This means that occupations
are separated: some are for men and others for women. The
origin of segregation can occur on different grounds. To begin
with, self-selection phenomenon, the selection by women to
depart from higher level positions choosing instead to dedicate
themselves to more traditional family roles. The latter leads us
to the glass escalator effect, through which women must watch
as men surpass them on the way to the top of the organizations
(Snyder and Green, 2008).
Sheridan and Milgate (2003) “attribute the lack of female
directors to the scarce number of women as senior managers.”
The case of management is particularly interesting since it has
traditionally been viewed as a male domain requiring specific
sets of skills. But simultaneously, women who are on the way to
getting power are at risk for the backlash effect (Rudman, 1998),
seen as a social and economic punishment for defying stereotypic
expectations, and consequently at risk of prejudice and hiring
discrimination. Working women who demonstrate stereotypical
male behaviors are likely to face setbacks because they do
not fit the female stereotype, especially in top positions. One
explanation of this phenomenon is that women who demonstrate
hard skills that are consistent with successful managers, can be
perceived negatively by some co-workers for not behaving in a
traditional feminine way. These women are perceived as more
competent, but at the same time less socially skilled, less likable
and less likely to be promoted.
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Moreover, women need to comply with masculine norms
of behavior if they are to break through the glass ceiling,
acting as masculine manager stereotypes, and exceeding male
cultural norms. Liff and Ward (2001, p. 20) pointed out that
“organizations are also the site within which women come
to understand the requirements of senior jobs and their own
career options. Organizational cultures, structures, and practices
provide the context within which this occurs and can lead women
to decide that such jobs, or the process they would have to
go through to get them, are not for them.” This can lead to a
generalized managerial assumption that women are satisfied to
continue in their present position, whilst male peers indicate
much more strongly to the person responsible for promotions
their readiness for the next step up. Traditional female family
responsibilities could hinder commitment to the organization
and their lack of involvement in corporate networks limits the
access of women to senior jobs. The gender bias seems to rest on
employers’ stereotypes of women, as more trustworthy, honest,
meticulous and patient (Aganon, 1999).
Other explanations present women as more skilful than men
in terms of team-building and communication but worse in
terms of business skills. Based on these attitudes, women and
men are therefore matched to different jobs, “which require
different traits, consistent with the views of the dominant
group holding that job.” Outstanding research by Schein and
colleagues over a period of more than 40 years showed that the
role of “managers has been associated with male characteristics,
not only in the United States” but in several other countries
as well (e.g., Schein, 2007), posing the think manager-think
male effect. This situation might explain by itself that white
men hold a disproportionate number of the highest paying
jobs and account for the best opportunities for advancement.
Therefore, white men will be less disadvantaged at this stage than
white women. Managers and employees of professional firms
tend toward the homosocial reproduction in organizations
where they were drawn, hiring co-workers similar to
themselves.
Following Goldman et al. (2006), the consequences of
gender discrimination can exist both at an organizational level
and at an individual level also. For example, discrimination
affects negatively the psychological health of women, and
even stigmatizes them if they publicly denounce having been
discriminated.
Summing up this section, women have been suffering
the personal and social consequences of a disadvantageous
situation both outside and inside organizations due to several
cultural and biased decision-making practices revolving around
discrimination issues, mainly based on stereotyping their
competences in order to avoid them holding managerial
positions. But, as we can see in the next sections the contribution
of women to organizational performance should be highlighted
as their role could be beneficial for organizations in many ways.
Now we focus on the influence that female directors can have on
firm value in the form of financial performance and risk-taking
with specific attention being paid to their role in executive pay
setting.
Female Directors and Boards Performance
The Board of Directors is a control governance mechanism,
aimed to monitor managerial activities so as to mitigate agency
costs (Jensen, 1993), and to set the strategic objectives which
should orientate the course of the company (Hillman andDalziel,
2003). The Board’s supervisory tasks include: monitoring the
CEO, and the implementation of the firms long term strategy,
firing and hiring the CEO and assessing and rewarding the
CEO/top managers of the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
There are opposing views on the forces driving executive
remuneration design. According to the optimal contracting
perspective on executive remuneration, managerial
remuneration packages should align the divergent interests
of managers and shareholders. In this regard, remuneration
constitutes a mechanism which provides incentives and
discipline to executives, ensuring that the marginal benefits that
can be obtained from opportunistic behavior are lower than the
opportunity costs associated with this behavior in terms of lower
payments from the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
In contrast, the managerial power approach (Jensen, 1993;
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bebchuk et al., 2002a,b; Bebchuk
and Fried, 2003) argues that the design and implementation of
executive remuneration policies is a potential source of conflict
as powerful executives can influence managerial compensation
design, which can result in sub-optimal compensation contracts.
An executive remuneration structure should be aligned with
the interests of shareholders and other employees, company’s
performance, long-term strategy and corporate and social
responsibility commitments. Therefore, regulators and corporate
good governance codes propose, among other recommendations,
that the board of directors is dominated by independent directors
and hence, set up a nomination and remuneration committee
(hereafter, NRC) to independently evaluate the remuneration
policy of company executives and oversee that it is performance-
related, and complies with the principles of moderation and
transparency.
The effective implementation of the board of directors’
functions involves designing an adequate system of incentives
for executives and, at the same time, ensuring that the board
structure is diverse in terms of gender, races and experience
of their members (Westphal and Milton, 2000). The Higgs
Report (2003) suggested that gender diversity increases board
effectiveness and therefore recommended that more women
be incorporated to boards, which has long been considered
an organizational good practice. The arguments for gender
diversity on corporate boards are manifold. Gender diverse
boards provide access to a broader knowledge base (Sheridan
et al., 2011; Laguir and Den Besten, 2016), which in turn
expands the set of experiences and points of view available in
an all-male board (Daily and Dalton, 2003). As a work group,
adding female directors to the boards’ composition improves
the working environment (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997), reduces
directors’ absenteeism (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and produces
better board deliberations (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Kravitz,
2003). Having female representation on the board also has
the advantage of adding legitimacy to the firm, as inequality
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between men and women’s rights is seen as unacceptable in
developed countries. From the agency theory perspective gender
diverse boards are also optimal, since they produce superior
monitoring outcomes as compared to all male boards (Adams
and Ferreira, 2009). There are also numerous studies that have
linked gender-diverse boards with better financial performance
(Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2006;
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Liu
et al., 2014; Terjesen et al., 2016), better governance (Adams and
Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2013), increased innovation (Miller
and Triana, 2009; Torchia et al., 2011), and firms’ corporate
social responsibility (Bear et al., 2010). Nonetheless, as female
are a minority group, it is not clear how their influence could
take place. Following Minority Conversion Model (Moscovici,
1985), minorities activate social validation process focusing on
the object of disagreement. That is, minorities influence take
place indirectly through conversion, a latent change, intimate;
whilst majorities influence take place through a direct way, fast
and in public (Mugny et al., 1991). Social comparison operates
more on different opinions (Nemeth, 1986). When we compare
majority groups with minorities some social differences emerge
(Maass, 1991): minorities are seen as more salient, different, with
less credibility, and being under high social pressure. Following
excellent Mannix and Neale (2005) revision on this topic we
are going to address deeply this issue. Majority groups has been
traditionally consider as more powerful and influencers through
the pressure for conformity (e.g., Janis, 1982), because it is
assumed integration and social validation. However, Westphal
and Milton (2000) demonstrated that the influence of minorities
can avoid outgroup biases that would otherwise minimize their
influence when they have prior experience on other boards
or social network links to other directors that foster them to
create the image of similarity with the majority. As Nemeth
(1986) stated, “minority opinions provoke majority members
to respond with an augmented cognitive flexibility, probably
because of the social pressure of the team to converge to a single
decision or consensus” (Moscovici, 1985), and in the case of
boards presenting a documented remuneration proposal. Mugny
and Papastamou (1980) found that “the consistent disagreement
of two is stronger than one disagreement.” More on this
Larson et al. (2004) found coalitions to be particularly effective
at persuading the group. Finally, Moscovici (1985), proposed
that double minorities (different in demographic characteristics
and opinions) might exert greater latent influence than in-
group minorities (similar to the majority in their demographic
characteristics but have divergent opinions). Outgroup members
with divergent perspectives may be more willing to express
opinions and exert influence on the group, avoiding cognitive
dissonance and enhancing the out-group member to validate her
contribution to the group.
There is also a large body of literature that investigates the
effect of board gender diversity on firm risk. The study of Lenard
et al. (2014) shows that more gender diversity in a board of
directors impacts firm risk by contributing to lower variability
of stock market return. Results in Australia by Hutchinson
et al. (2015) also show that gender diversity moderates excessive
firm risk which in turn improves firms’ financial performance.
Faccio et al. (2016), found that transitions from male to female
CEOs (or from female to male) are associated with economically
and statistically significant reductions (increases) in corporate
risk-taking. On the contrary, Sila et al. (2016), have not found
evidence that female board representation affects firm risk in
a sample of US firms. Croson and Gneezy (2009) found that
women could be more risk averse in the general population
but not in managerial positions where differences are smaller
and often inexistent. Here, a self-selection phenomenon could
be at the origin of this exception. Another explanation can be
grounded on the situational theory by Mischel (1968, 2004),
who established that when the situation is strong enough (e.g.,
limited with social norms, rules, etc.), personality differences
between subjects are less explicit. In consequence, behavior is
more specific and unstable depending on the situation, in a way
that when the latter is unambiguous behavior is more similar.
Female Directors and Executive Pay
In order to avoid possible conflicts of interest interfering
in the optimal design of remuneration policies, the board
and NRC need a high degree of independence, experience,
knowledge, expertise, and values (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
In this sense, gender diversity can help provide these skills,
necessary for the optimal design of remuneration policies. Several
prior studies have examined the effect of gender diversity
on NRC when designing executive pay arrangements. This
scarce but emerging literature investigates mainly whether top
management pay and corporate performance are more aligned
in companies with gender-diverse compensation committees,
leading to mixed results. The study by Borrenbergs et al. (2017),
investigates the relationship between female presence in the
remuneration committee and the relative weight of performance
contingent pay for top executives. The findings, based on a
detailed analysis of a sample of public US and Canadian firms,
show strong evidence supporting the fact that gender-diverse
compensation committees are associated with lower levels
of annual bonuses in top executives’ remuneration contracts
(variable short-term compensation). However, the models do
not provide evidence with respect to the relative weight of total
variable compensation, that is, when other long-term variable
compensations are considered (option awards, stock grants and
long-term incentive plans). Other studies have found evidence of
a negative relationship between gender diversity compensation
committees and CEO pay. A study by Bugeja et al. (2016), based
on annual company data collected between 2002 and 2009 show
that CEO compensation levels are negatively associated with the
gender-diversity of the compensation committee, but not with
the gender-diversity of the board.
OBJECTIVE
In this study we have focused on the role played by female
directors on boards and remuneration committees when
designing and implementing CEOs incentive schemes. Our work
expands upon previous research on the association between
gender-diverse boards (and compensation committees) and CEO
remuneration packages by analyzing whether the percentage of
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dissent say on pay vote is different for firms with and without
gender-diverse compensation committees.
Taking into account all of the above considerations
regarding the positive association of female directors with
board monitoring performance, we can hypothesize that the
presence of female board members is positively associated with
CEO wage moderation. Consequently, we can hypothesize the
influence of females as minority group on male majority group
on boards.
Also, when considering the negative association of female
directors with firm risk and risk-taking incentives provided
by option-based remuneration, we expect to see a negative
association between female director representation and the use
of this form of incentive pay.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
Our sample includes unbalanced panel data from companies
listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange between 2011 and 2015.
Companies going public between 2011 and 2015 have been
added to the sample in the year of their initial public offer and
companies de-listed have been eliminated in the year of that
event. We have obtained all corporate governance information
related to board structure, committees, CEO remuneration and
ownership structure of the firms from the registers of the
National commission of the stock Exchange (Comisión Nacional
del Mercado de Valores or CNMV). The accounting data to
determine the size of the company, its profitability and leverage
comes from the records of the CNMV and SABI (Sistema de
Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) databases. Finally, the share prices
to estimate market returns are obtained from Capital IQ.
Variables
Themain variables of our study are CEO pay and the results from
the annual vote issued by the firms’ shareholders about the firm’s
executive compensation plan, these being used as dependent
variables. As we are mainly interested in the moderation and
risk incentives provided by executive pay, we analyse the relative
annual increase of CEO pay and the proportion of equity and
option-based CEO pay. The first is proxied by the annual increase
of total CEO pay scaled by the previous CEO total pay. The
second is proxied by the ratio of equity and option-based CEO
pay components scaled by total CEO pay.
Our main independent variables are the presence of female
directors on the board and the nomination and remuneration
committee. We proxy the female influence on the firm’s
corporate governance system with three variables, that is, by
the proportion of female directors scaled respectively by the
number of members on the board, the audit committee, and
the nomination and remuneration committee. Alternatively, we
use a set of dummy variables that take the value of one when
there is at least one female director on the board, the audit
committee, or the nomination and remuneration committee.
The influence of female directors on executive compensation
may differ depending on the independent status of the directors
considered. Therefore, to investigate the possible differences
between executive, independent and proprietary female board
members on executive pay, we have included the proportion
of executive independent and proprietary female directors in
relation to the total board size. We also include in our regression
models the corresponding dummy variables representing the
presence of such directors on the board.
We control for both board and committee composition and
size that are considered to affect their supervisory activity.We use
the proportion of independent board directors as a proxy of the
board’s independency. The size of the board and its committees
are controlled by the logarithm of the total number of board
directors.
We control possible firm size effects on all models through
the inclusion of the logarithm of the book value of total assets
measured in thousands of constant Euros. We also include
controls for financial leverage and performance and investment
opportunities that may affect CEO pay. We proxy the firm’s
performance with two different variables: company Return on
assets, measured by the ratio of EBIT to total assets and the
market annual performance. Finally, we control for the firm’s
investment opportunities by including the market to book ratio
defined as the market value of the firm8s equity scaled by its book
value.
The models account for the possible effects of the changes
in general economic conditions by including year dummies. As
executive pay may vary across industries, we have also included
Standard Industrial classification (SIC) dummy variables to
control for this effect.
Data Analysis
The following regression equation is used to test our hypotheses
related to two alternative outcomes: the annual growth rate of
CEO pay and the proportion equity and option-based CEO
remuneration;
yi,t = α+ β
′Mi,t + δ
′Xi,t + µi + λt + εi,t (1)
where our dependent variable, y indexes either a CEO pay
growth rate or the proportion of equity and option-based CEO
pay by firm i in year t, M is a vector of variables of interest
that are potential determinants of CEO remuneration—female
representation on the board, the remuneration committee and
the audit committee. X is a control vector that includes board
independence and size, firm size, profitability, leverage, and
investment opportunities variables. Our model also includes
industry (µi) and year (λt) fixed-effects and allows for
heteroscedastic error terms that are clustered at firm level (εi,t).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample. Gender-diverse
board of director companies (i.e., boards that have at least one
female director) have increased from 59.24% in 2012 to 75.54%
in 2015. We can attribute the rise of female participation on
the board of directors to the progressive implementation of
the Spanish Organic Law 3/2007, regarding effective equality
between men and women. This Law prescribes large listed
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TABLE 1 | Sample description.
(A) Frequency of firms by year (2012–2015).
Total Female presence on boards All-male board of directors
Fiscal year Number firms Number firms Percentage Number of firms Percentage
2012 157 93 24.16% 64 30.34%
2013 153 87 22.60% 66 31.28%
2014 147 100 25.97% 47 22.27%
2015 139 105 27.27% 34 16.11%
Total 596 385 100% 211 100%
(B) Frequency of firms by year: all-male vs. female presence on boards.
2012 2013 2014 2015
Type of board Number firms Percentage Number firms Percentage Number firms Percentage Number firms Percentage
All-male 64 40.76% 66 43.14% 47 31.97% 34 24.46%
Gender-diverse 93 59.24% 87 56.86% 100 68.03% 105 75.54%
Total 157 100% 153 100% 147 100% 139 100%
TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics.
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Annual CEO pay (thousand euros) 243 1,487.769 29,336.24 31 241,919
Relative annual increase of CEO pay 243 0.067 0.9376 −0.966 6.2711
Proportion of dissent say on may vote 329 0.028 0.0758 0 0.0933
Proportion of board female directors 243 0.115 0.1036 0 0.5
Proportion of audit committee female directors 236 0.132 0.1730 0 0.6666
Proportion of remuneration committee female directors 213 0.112 0.1720 0 0.8
Proportion of proprietary board female directors 243 0.05 0.0775 0 0.3846
Proportion of executive board female directors 243 0.007 0.0310 0 0.2222
Proportion of independent board female directors 243 0.058 0.0797 0 0.5
Female directors presence (board) 243 0.712 0.4537 0 1
Proprietary female directors presence (board) 243 0.387 0.4880 0 1
Executive female directors presence (board) 243 0.058 0.2334 0 1
Independent female directors presence (board) 243 0.399 0.4907 0 1
Proportion of equity and option based CEO pay 243 0.103 0.3648 0 2.7663
Proportion of board independent directors 243 0.335 0.1747 0 0.8888
Board size 243 11.49 4.717 1 36
Remuneration committee size 213 4.333 1.7174 1 12
Audit committee size 243 4.097 1.5419 1 12
Total assets (thousand euros) 243 3,596,727 7,753,106 12,039.73 5.01E + 07
Return on assets 243 0.035 0.1213 −0.428 0.3614
Annual market return 243 0.1 0.4898 −0.823 2.0217
Book to market ratio 243 1.884 2.7633 −1.138 22.129
companies to reach a 40% female representation on the board of
directors in 8 years.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used are presented in
Table 2. The mean annual total CEO remuneration is 1,487,769
Euros with an average annual increase of 6.72% over the period
2012–2015. We have reported an average 2.83% of dissent says
on pay vote, resulting in a much lower opposition to executive
remuneration plan than in the US market. For instance, in the
same period of our study, the consultancy firm Semler Brossy
reports for the Rusell 3,000 firms that the opposition say on
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TABLE 3 | Comparisons of firms with and without female directors between 2012 and 2015.
Variable Firms with female directors Firms with no female directors Mean difference t
Mean Mean
Annual CEO pay thousand euros 1342.64 880.80 461.83*** 26.472
Relative annual increase of CEO pay 0.0278 0.08113 0.0532 0.4549
Proportion of equity and option based CEO pay 0.3364 0.0616 0.0537 1.2738
Proportion of dissent say on may vote 0.0285 0.0189 0.0096 14.639
Proportion of board independent directors 0.3364 0.2855 0.0508*** 53.644
Board size 11.0727 9.3044 1.7683*** 84.843
Logarithm of total assets 12.5226 12.4360 0.0866 0.6282
Return on assets 0.0246 0.0211 0.0035 0.3129
Annual market return 0.0687 0.0875 −0.0187 −0.6226
Book to market ratio 2.6056 3.1693 −0.5636 −0.9521
Debt to assets ratio 0.5927 0.6839 −0.0911 −11.117
***p < 0.01. In bold statistically significant coefficients of variables of interest.
pay vote ranged from a minimum level of 8% in 2016 to
a maximum level of 10% in 2012. The proportion of female
directors is 11% for the board and the remuneration committee
and 13% for the audit committee. This 11% proportion of
female directors is comprised of independent directors (5.3%),
proprietary directors (4.9%) and executive directors (0.7%). To
conserve space, we omit discussion of the descriptive statistics of
our control variables.
Table 3 shows the univariate analysis of the mean differences
between companies with and without female directors (gender-
diverse and all-male board of directors) for the period 2012–
2015. Companies with female directors offer a higher CEO
total remuneration, a higher percentage of short-term and long-
term variable remuneration than those companies with all male
boards. The mean value of CEO total pay is 461.83 thousand
euros higher for firms with gender-diverse boards of directors.
We also note that companies with gender diverse board directors
are bigger and show both a higher percentage of independent
directors and larger Boards.
Tables 4–7 show our estimations of the effect of female
directors both on the growth rate of CEOs’ pay and the
proportion equity and option-based CEO remuneration. Table 8
displays the effect of female directors on the percentage of
shareholders opposition to the managerial remuneration plan
presented at the Annual General Meeting (negative or dissent
say on pay vote). Results in Tables 4, 5 show respectively that
the proportion of female directors on the remuneration and
nomination committee and the indicator of the presence of
female members on this committee both relate negatively to the
growth rate of CEO pay. The presence of female directors on
the board committee specifically responsible for the design of
executive pay design is associated to a moderation in the growth
of CEO pay.
The economic effect of female directors on the nomination
and remuneration committee is not negligible. The coefficient
in column 3 of Table 4 indicates that an increase of one
standard deviation in the proportion of female directors on
the nomination and remuneration committee is associated with
a 13% reduction in the growth rate of CEO compensation.
The coefficient in column 3 of Table 5 indicates that having at
least one female director on the remuneration and nomination
committee is associated with a 23% reduction in the growth rate
of CEO pay.
The models predicting the proportion of equity and option-
based CEO pay displayed in columns 4–6 of Tables 4, 5 show
positive coefficients for all the proxies of female board and
committee membership. However, none of these coefficients
are statistically significant at conventional levels. Altogether,
our results suggest that female directors on the remuneration
committee are associated to lower growth rates of CEO pay, no
specific effect appears to exist in terms of the use of long term
incentives in the executive pay mix.
In terms of types of directors, Tables 6, 7 suggest that the
proportion of proprietary directors is associated to lower levels
of CEO pay growth. The coefficient in the second column of
Table 6 indicates that an increase of one standard deviation of
the proportion of proprietary female directors is associated with
a 10% decrease in executive pay growth. The second model
in Table 7 indicates that having female proprietary directors is
associated with a 26% lower growth rate in CEO pay.
We also display in the sixth column of Table 6 a significant
and negative relationship between the proportion of board
executive female directors and the proportion of equity and
option-based CEO remuneration. Nevertheless, the economic
importance of this effect is relatively small. An increase in
one standard deviation in the proportion of executive female
directors is associated with a 0.19% reduction in the proportion
of equity and option-based remuneration. The corresponding
model in Table 7 indicates that having one or more female
executive directors is associated with a 6% lower proportion of
equity and option- based CEO remuneration.
Table 8 shows the results for the analysis of the relationship
between female directorships and the proportion of shareholders’
opposition to the managerial compensation plan voted at the
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TABLE 8 | Regression results of Dissent say on pay vote on female directors’ weight.
Variable Proportion of dissent say on may vote
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B t B t B t
Proportion of board female directors −0.0346 −1.00
Proportion of audit committee female directors −0.000724 −0.03
Proportion of remuneration committee female directors −0.0478*** −2.73
Proportion of board independent directors −0.0106 −0.42 −0.0108 −0.42 −0.00388 −0.16
Logarithm of board size 0.0124* 1.79 0.0123 1.52 0.0127* 1.80
Logarithm of total assets 0.00267 1.61 0.00254 1.43 0.00233 1.35
Return on assets 0.0371 1.42 0.0386 1.52 0.0429 1.61
Debt to assets ratio 0.00709 0.75 0.00685 0.71 0.0102 0.83
Annual market return 0.00547 0.87 0.00441 0.71 0.00769 1.02
Book to market ratio −0.000684 −0.84 −0.000659 −0.80 −0.000364 −0.49
Constant −0.0214 −0.94 −0.0247 −1.06 −0.0288 −1.27
No. of Obs. 371 361 329
Adjusted R2 0.0537 0.0504 0.0617
F 4.149 4.212 4.102
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
No. Clusters 108 108 106
Regressions are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered by company. All models include 2-digit SIC and year dummies. *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01. In bold statistically significant
coefficients of variables of interest.
annual general meeting (dissent say on pay vote). Coefficients
for all the proxies of female directorships are negative, but only
statistically significant in the case of female directorships on the
remuneration and nomination committee. The coefficient in the
third column of Table 8 indicates that a one standard deviation
in the proportion of female directors on the remuneration and
nomination committee is associated with a lower 0.8% dissent
say on pay vote. This reduction in say on pay opposition might
appear to be negligible but represents 30% of the average negative
say on pay vote. This result is consistent with the moderating role
of female directors on this committee reported in Tables 4, 5.
Moreover, with the set of control variables used across all
the estimated models we have obtained evidence of a negative
relationship between the firm’s market return and the proportion
of equity and option-based CEO pay. This result could be
explained as an attempt of low performing firms to improve their
market returns by providing variable incentives to their CEOs.
Option and equity-based CEO pay formulas provide the CEOs
with incentives to create value for shareholders, that is, to align
their interests with those of the firm.
Overall, our results suggest that female directors on the
nomination and remuneration committee are both associated
with lower levels of CEO pay growth and lower levels of
shareholder opposition to the executive remuneration plan. This
result suggests that the moderating role of female remuneration
committee members is valued positively by firm owners. All in
all, these results provide support to our hypothesis that female
directors contribute toward CEO pay moderation. We also have
partial support for the hypothesis that female directors reduce
the use of option-based executive compensation given that our
results only hold for executive female directors. This can be
explained by the natural risk aversion of executives and at the
same time by the low proportion of option-based executive pay in
the Spanish market which renders this matter less relevant when
designing executive pay plans.
DISCUSSION
The current debate about women on corporate boards of
directors focuses on closing the pay gap and opening company
boardrooms up to more women. The search for a political and
social solution has led to additional and new legislation that
involves an increased use of measures for the advancement of
women to reduce gender gaps.
In addressing gender equality, we need to recognize that in all
developed countries there are concerns about how to improve the
situation of women in different settings of the professional arena.
Women have reached higher education levels than men, so at the
European level women represent 60% of all workers with higher
education but only a 45% of total employment. However, when
we look at the management positions, there seems to be a “glass
ceiling” that prevents women from accessing positions of power
and greater responsibility. Our sample shows that the percentage
of female executive directors is low with only 5% of listed firms
having female executive directors.
In Spain, following the implementation of the Organic
Law 3/2007 on effective equality between men and women, it
was recommended, not imposed, to increase and to include
a minimum 40% of women on the boards of directors.
The progressive implementation of effective gender equality
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legislation has favored the increase of women on the boards of
directors in Spain. Their presence has gone from 6% in 2007 up
to 17% nowadays. A very limited advance, more so when we
consider that only 5% of executive directors are women. This
means thatmost women are proprietary or independent directors
with less decision-making power than executive directors on
the board of directors. Nonetheless, there is a gap between the
moment when new legislation is passed and the moment on
which the implementation of such measures takes place (for
instance, García-Izquierdo et al., 2010, 2015), so a progressive
incorporation of women to boards during coming years is
expected despite the objective of such 40% should be obtained
by 2015 (eight years after legislation has passed). Nonetheless,
reasons for this scarce implementation are not clear. We can
say that 3/2007 Law explicitly state a recommendation (i.e., try
to reach) but not a compulsory objective, nor any punishment
nor any reward. Probably, in this matter of gender in traditional
organizational contexts “hard law” would be more effective than
“soft law.” Simultaneously, as Boards are mainly composed by
men probably they are aware or not committed enough for such
social objective. Moreover, the economic crisis could easily have
an effect on shaping organizational decisions to more tangible
measures.
All in all, this paper corroborates that although the legislation
in Spain presents a margin for improvement, as soft law, the
incorporation of women appears to exert a positive effect in terms
of higher wage moderation, and restraint in the use of long-term
variable remuneration systems.
We have shown also how the presence of female directors
on the board of directors and on the remuneration committee
can provide a valuable tool for moderating CEO pay. Moreover,
our results show that the presence of female directors on the
remuneration committee is associated with lower growth rates
of CEO pay, which can be considered a better organizational
outcome in terms of good governance. This represent a clear
proxy evidence of minority influence on boards, despite it is quite
difficult to reveal the underlying mechanisms that are taking
place in boards decision-making processes as is well known the
meetings are more like a blackbox.
This research has been focused on the analysis of the
relationship between the presence of women and CEO
remuneration policy on boards of directors, but it would
be interesting to include in the analysis other personal
characteristics of the directors such as previous professional
experience on other boards and academic and professional
background. Nevertheless, we have seen that this limitation
should not be particularly crucial as we can expect that
personal, educational and professional profiles of male and
female directors of companies operating in Spain do not differ
significantly, even in family businesses due the implementation
of the protocol.
Moreover, it should be quite interesting and appealing
to unveil group processes and decision making mechanisms
in order to be more informative and transparent for the
stakeholders.
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